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Place-Based Consequences
of Person-Based Transfers
Brad J. Hershbein
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Local labor markets that lose
greater shares of employment
during recessions suffer
persistent relative decreases in
earnings per capita.
n The social safety net
responds, and areas with 5
percent greater employment
losses experience per-capita
government transfers 2.5
percent higher even a
decade later.
n These transfers replace about
25 percent of lost earnings in
the long term, and much
of this is through retirement
and disability (Social Security)
or health (Medicare
and Medicaid).
n The social safety net thus
helps affected places as
well as people, but the longterm assistance does little
to help with needed skills
development or job creation.
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As the nation continues to recover from the
economic recession caused by the COVID-19
pandemic, Congress continues to debate
how to extend the social safety net, even afer
unprecedented (and temporary) responses over
the past 18 months. An important part of the
debate is whether government assistance should
expand beyond what is traditionally thought of as
social insurance—transfers like the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, also known
as food stamps), Temporary Assistance to Needy
families (TANF), and unemployment insurance
(UI)—to also cover programs that increase skills
development, such as employment training and
tuition-free community college. Tis matters
because previous research has shown that areas
that were particularly hard hit during a recession
can sufer long-lasting declines in employment
rates and per-capita earnings relative to areas that
escaped the recession unscathed (Hershbein and
Stuart 2020). With parts of the country heavily
reliant on tourism still lagging behind in their
economic recovery, it is an open question how
well the social safety net—or government transfers
more generally—respond to recessions not just
in the short term but over longer horizons as
well. If transfers remain elevated persistently,
then places that experience only mild recessions
implicitly subsidize through the tax code places
that experience bad recessions, even as economic
opportunity remains depressed in these latter
places.
In forthcoming work, my coauthor Bryan
A. Stuart and I examine the response of the
social safety net to place-specifc shifs in
economic activity arising from recessions over
the past 50 years. Drawing on annual data we
have harmonized for 363 metropolitan areas,
we estimate how average receipt of diferent
government transfer programs, on a per-capita
basis, evolve for up to a decade afer each of the

fve recessions between the 1970s and the Great
Recession. (We cannot yet investigate the COVID
recession.)
We fnd that person-based transfer programs
generate a substantial amount of place-based redistribution. Metropolitan areas that experience
more severe employment losses during a recession
face lasting reductions in employment and

A typically-sized metro of
260,000 people that sufers a worse
recession will receive over half a
billion dollars more in transfers over
the next decade.
earnings per capita, but they also receive lasting
increases in transfers per capita. Our estimates
imply that a metro area experiencing a 5 percent
greater employment loss during the recession has
total transfers per capita 2.5 percent higher nearly
a decade afer the recession ended. For a metro
area of typical size, about 260,000 residents, this
translates into more than half a billion dollars of
transfers over this time period. Moreover, most of
these transfers are not from what we think of as
either employment-related social insurance or the
traditional safety net of means-tested programs.
Although the former (UI) does respond in the
short term, the increase fades away relatively
quickly; the latter safety net programs show a
more sustained rise, but they are relatively small,
accounting for only a tenth of total transfers.
Instead, large entitlement programs including
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid continue
to grow afer a recession and account for nearly all
of the long-term increase. Education and training
programs, which might help boost skills and future
earnings, barely respond at all.
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Government Transfers in the
United States
Te United States transfers
considerable sums of money to
individuals through various programs.
As of 2017, and across 363 metro areas
accounting for more than 80 percent

Total transfers replace about one-ffth
of lost earnings soon after the
Great Recession ended in 2009, but
this share rises over time.
of the total population, per-person
transfers averaged nearly $8,300
annually. Tis represents a quadrupling
since 1970, even afer adjusting for
infation, and over 15 percent of
average income. As shown in Figure
1, much of these transfers consist of
retirement and disability insurance—
Social Security, essentially—and
medical programs including Medicare
and Medicaid. Te latter category has

grown especially quickly, becoming
the largest category around 2000 and
today consisting of almost half of total
transfers. By comparison, income
maintenance or means-tested programs
(primarily TANF and its predecessor,
the Earned Income Tax Credit, SNAP,
and Supplemental Security Income)
equal about 10 percent of total transfers
on average. Unemployment insurance
is much smaller on average, though it
tends to rise afer recessions and job
losses. Transfers for veterans (pensions
and VA coverage) and education and
training (Pell Grants and workforce
training) are quite small on the whole,
in part because their coverage is much
more limited than the other programs.
Our Analysis
To investigate how employment
losses during a recession afect percapita transfers, we compare how these
transfers evolve each year between
metro areas that experienced diferentsized employment changes, or shocks,

Figure 1 Per-Capita Transfers Have Risen Sharply over Time
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NOTE: The fgure reports national annual totals, per person, of diferent government transfers by category across
363 metropolitan areas (CBSAs), together accounting for about 80 percent of the U.S. population. Amounts are in
dollars per person, infation-adjusted to 2017.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
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during the recession. We separately
analyze fve national recessions: those
in 1973–1975, 1980–1982 (we combine
1980 and 1982 in this “double-dip”
recession), 1990–1991, 2001, and
2007–2009. Our approach assumes that
the path of per-capita transfers would
have evolved similarly between areas
in the absence of difering recession
severity. To make this assumption
more plausible, we control for several
characteristics of the metro areas.
Tese include pre-recession population
growth for diferent age groups to
control for demographic diferences
and (nine) census division indicators
so that we are implicitly comparing
metro areas within the same division
of the country. In both of these cases,
we allow these controls to vary by
each year we observe transfers, thus
controlling for age dynamics (such as
the diferential aging of the population)
and gradual shifs in economic
activity, such as the rise of the sunbelt.
We further control for metro area
characteristics that don’t vary over
time, so our results capture changes
relative to a metro’s own pre-recession
path, vis-à-vis the changes in another
metro that difered in recession
intensity.

Figure 2 shows how per-capita
transfers respond in metros with a
1 percent greater employment loss
during the respective recession. Te
horizontal axis measures years since
the recession ends (more specifcally,
when national employment bottomed
out; recessions typically begin two
years earlier). Tus, the lef-most part
of the fgure shows the period before
the recession begins. Tat values are
close to zero indicates that diferences
in transfers between areas that will
experience severe recessions and those
that will experience mild recessions
are small before the recession begins,
in line with expectations. Once the
recession begins, however, transfers
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rise sharply, and reach a value of about
0.5 by recession’s end; this means
that a 1 percent greater loss in metro
employment during the recession
implies a 0.5 percent greater increase
in per-capita transfers. Moreover, even
afer the recession is over, each line
stays elevated above zero and some
even continue to grow. Terefore, even
a decade later transfers are higher in
metro areas that experienced a more
severe recession: across recessions, a
5 percent greater recession-induced
employment loss on average implies 2.5
percent greater transfers per person.
How much of the persistent loss in
per-capita earnings do these transfers
replace, and which types of transfers
account for this sustained rise? We
address these questions for the Great
Recession in Figure 3. Total transfers
replace about one-ffh of lost earnings
soon afer the Great Recession ended
in 2009, but this share rises over time
(partly because earnings also somewhat
recover over time while transfers stay
about the same). By 2017, eight years
afer the recession’s end, transfers
replace about 60 percent of earnings
losses that year. (Te pattern varies
somewhat for previous recessions, but
the replacement share tends to rise over
time.) Figure 3 also shows that while UI
shows a slight bump near the end of the
recession, the efect fades, and medical
and retirement and disability programs
(Medicare, Medicaid, and Social
Security) account for the vast majority
of the long-term rise. Other programs,
including traditional safety net ones,
contribute less, especially over time.
Discussion and Implications
Tese results paint a nuanced
picture of the response of the safety
net. Programs that receive the
greatest attention in discussions
of countercyclical policy—such as
unemployment insurance, TANF, and
SNAP—play little role in ofsetting
the long-run relative earnings losses
in metro areas that experience more
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Figure 2 Transfers Remain Elevated after the Recession Ends
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NOTE: The fgure reports estimates of the impact of a 1 percent greater employment loss on the percent
change in per-capita transfers for the years surrounding a recession, for each of fve recession. The vertical
black line at 0 indicates the end of the recession—when employment has bottomed out; thus, positive
numbers on the horizontal axis indicate years since the recession ended while negative numbers count
backwards (most recessions begin at t−2). A value of 0.5 on the vertical axis means that a 1 percent greater
employment loss results in a 0.5 percent greater increase in per-capita transfers.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and other data.

Figure 3 Transfers Replace Only Part of Lost Earnings
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NOTE: The fgure reports how the increased transfers from Figure 2 compare to losses in per-capita earnings
by year and transfer type. For example, in 2010 the increase in total transfers from a 1 percent greater
recession-induced employment loss replaced about 20 percent of per-capita earnings losses that year from
the same recession-induced employment loss.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and other data.
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severe recessions. On the other hand,
programs such as Social Security
retirement, Disability Insurance,
Medicare, and Medicaid partially
insure areas against the longer-term
efects of recessions. On average,
transfers ofset 25 percent of the
decline in earnings in metro areas hit
harder by recessions. Furthermore,
federal transfers that are nominally
person-based provide implicit,
persistent, and underappreciated
geographic transfers from
economically more successful places
to economically less successful places.
Because the long-run
consequences of recessions on local
labor markets are not yet widely
appreciated, there has been little
discussion of whether the existing
structure of the social safety net
constitutes an appropriate policy
response, not just for individuals
but for communities as a whole.
An important direction for future
research is to study how nominally
person-based transfers interact
with place-based policies, such as
economic development block grants
and place-based scholarships, in
afecting efciency and equity of
the overall system of government
transfers. One important takeaway
from our results is that the most
responsive transfer programs in
the current system are unlikely
to encourage labor supply, skill
development, or job creation, which
could be essential factors in helping
hard-hit metro areas from falling
behind economically.
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Economic Costs and
Benefts of Tuition-Free
College in Illinois
Timothy J. Bartik, Michelle Miller-Adams, Brian Pittelko, and Bridget Timmeney
Why should states invest in free
college for their residents? With returns
to college degrees high and most new
jobs requiring a postsecondary degree
or credential, individual motivations
for college-going are easy to discern.
As more states create free-college
pathways for their residents—and as
more will be asked to do so if the Biden
administration’s tuition-free college
plan becomes law—policymakers
should recognize that free college also
generates substantial economic and
fscal returns for the state.
Tis article presents research
fndings on the economic and fscal
impacts from a hypothetical tuitionfree college program in Illinois. Te
research was carried out with fnancial
support from the Joyce Foundation
and the cooperation of the Governor’s
Ofce of the State of Illinois. More
information on how these fndings
were generated can be found in our
cost estimate and economic benefts
reports to the state.
Economic returns to free college
come in the form of higher earnings
for workers with degrees and spillover
benefts for other residents. Fiscal
returns occur when projected tax

revenues exceed the cost of a freecollege program. Of course, there are
many other benefts to increasing
educational attainment. Employers
have access to a better-trained
workforce, which spurs innovation
and productivity. Higher educational
attainment can also reduce crime and
substance abuse, help create more
stable families, and lead to better
outcomes for the children of college
graduates. Tese impacts, however, are
hard to quantify, so we focus here on
the direct earnings efects for graduates
and spillover efects for other residents.
For this project, we modeled two
versions of tuition-free college: one
model covers the community college
sector only and the other includes
both two-year and four-year public
institutions. Both adopt a last-dollar
structure in which a student’s Pell
Grants are used frst, with the state
grant closing any remaining gap in
tuition and fees.1
A free-tuition program in Illinois
would generate economic and fscal
benefts that far exceed its costs,
although the fscal benefts would
not be realized immediately. Te less

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Free college generates substantial economic and fiscal returns for the state.
n The combined two-year and four-year program, run for just the years 2021–2030,
would increase Illinois residents’ total earnings by $44.7 billion.
n We find that a two-year degree yields earnings gains per individual of between
$154,000 and $182,000 over their lifetime, while a four-year degree yields an earnings
gain of between $671,000 and $793,000.
n We estimate spillover effects on other Illinois residents at 86 percent of the direct
effect.

